Autographs
(1803) JAMES MONROE Secretarial Retained Copy Letter to ROBERT LIVINGSTON Regarding "The Louisiana Purchase" Regarding the French Financial Arrangements
(1803) Extensive Contemporary Retained Copy of a Letter from James Monroe as U.S. Minister to Great Britain to Robert Livingston in France, regarding their recently concluded Louisiana Purchase, Secretarial, Not written in Monroe's Hand, apparently written by his secretary at the U.S. Legation in London, Choice Very Fine.
An important content original "Louisiana Purchase" related Letter being a retained copy, apparently written by his secretary at the U.S. Legation in London, 5 pages, 8.25" x 12.75". In the Spring of 1803, James Monroe, then U.S. Minister to Great Britain, assisted Robert R. Livingston, then U.S. Minister to France, in negotiating the Louisiana Purchase, and both signed the Treaty on April 30, 1803 which formalized the purchase. Not written by James Monroe's hand, apparently written by his then secretary at the U.S. Legation in London.
A significant Letter with extensive historic content in which James Monroe tries to calm Robert Livingston's apprehensions over the financial terms of the Louisiana Purchase agreement with France. Here, he specifically refers to their Joint Letter of June 7th (1803) to the Secretary of State, James Madison, which included the financial arrangements made with Baring Brothers Company in London regarding payment of debts to France, as part of the Treaty's terms. One minor partial vertical fold split near the spine between the 2nd and 3rd pages, prior mounting traces to the left margin edge of the final page, nicely written in rich brown on high quality watermarked laid period paper. Concludes without signature, reading: "I am etc. etc."
This Letter reads, in part:
"...I have received your letter... by Mr. Baring & avail myself of the earliest opportunity to answer it. I perceive that you have misconceived our powers & instructions in what concerns our transactions with France. Our instructions unite us, our commission does so, as does the Act which gives us power over a certain sum of money to be applied promptly to the object of the negotiation. By the two letter instruments which would control the former if there was any variance between them, neither of us has power to act singly, but in case of death of the other, you well know that this construction prevailed through the whole of what has passed. On what principle then is it now supposed to be altered?
I can conceive some reasons why, if it is, the power should be considered as vested exclusively in you, not one why exclusively in me. The truth is it remains, in reference to any act to be performed under the commission, precisely where it did at first, that is in both of us. Had I possessed the power, exclusively, I should most certainly have exercised it, by making a prompt payment to the Go't of France of the sum in question in obedience to our instructions and with a view more effectually to secure a compliance with our treaties. Such prompt payment would have formed the basis of every consultation & conference with the Ministers of France on the subject.
It was owing to the circumstance of our power being joint, to your desire to apply that money to the payment of the debts, & to the pressure of other important considerations of the moment, that that payment was not made. I am persuaded, had it been done, that we should have avoided the anxiety which we afterwards felt, the details of which were communicated in our joint letter of June 7th to the Secretary of State, that we should in fact have placed beyond all hazard the final execution of the treaties; a result of primary importance to our creditors, since on it alone would we be justified in assuming the payment of their debts by our Go't which they so much desired.
It was to remedy that error, on an experience of its ill effects, that I suggested to the Ministers Talleyrand & Morbois the idea of a guarantee to Hope & Co., so far as depended on me, of the sum subjected to our disposition, with a view to promote the principles of our treaty...I made this suggestion to those Ministers on the evening of the 7 of June, the day on which I called to see the order of their Go't to Mr. Pichon for the delivery of the ratifications and surrender of the territory; a period, it is true, where our anxiety for the consequences was most excited. I remember, on stating to you immediately afterwards what had passed, that you did not hesitate to approve it, tho' you expressed your satisfaction that the offer was not accepted as I had supposed was the case...'
I am still of opinion that the guarantee of the sum proposed is an expedient and suitable measure and shall therefore execute it so far as my act can have that effect. All human events are subject to uncertainty. Accidents may happen which may put it out of the power of our government to ratify the treaties or create the stock within the terms specified. It appears to me to be proper to prevent the possibility of any discussion in such cases by increasing the disposition as well as the obligation of the French Go't to execute them notwithstanding, and from what I have seen of the integrity and fair dealing of the First Consul & the Ministers in this transaction, I am satisfied that the acceptance of the guarantee & payment of the money which the Bankers will make in consequence of it, would produce that effect...
Nothing is more uncertain than whether Spain will be able to preserve her neutrality in the present war. Her Minister is here still, nor is there any reason to suppose that he will not remain. Too much caution cannot be observed in our communications on European occurrences, to which you will attribute my not going further into that topic; happily we are at present but little interested in them & I hope we shall continue to be so... I am etc. etc."