(1893 - 1946) German politician who began his career as an ace in World War I, rose to become Hitler's right-hand man and head of the Luftwaffe, finally captured and committed suicide on the eve of his execution. CAUGHT UNPREPARED FOR RUSSIA, GORING ORDERS A MASSIVE LUFTWAFFE BUILD-UP. Historically important D.S. 'Goring' in indelible red pencil (as was his custom) on his Reichsmarshall letterhead as 'Head of the Ministry for the Defense of the Reich and Commissioner for the Four-Year Plan', 2pp. 4to., June 25, 1941. Only four days after the start of Operation Barbarossa, as German troops continue to overwhelm Russian defenses, Goring orders an emergency massive increase in production to supply the needs of the Luftwaffe, along with an enormous shift of labor and administration. He writes, in part: 'Authorization! The Fuhrer has ordered the highest possible increase in the German Air Force's defense capacity in the shortest possible time. The aim of the measures to be taken must be to quadruple the current output in all areas of air defense. I am entrusting the State Secretary for Aviation, Field Marshal Milch, with the swiftest possible implementation of this increase in armaments...I am authorizing him as far as possible in the areas outlined below: 1) Closure and confiscation of factories, determination of expropriations and compulsory leases, confiscation and expropriation of building materials in consultation with the GB-Bau, construction of makeshift buildings with exemption from restrictive regulations...insofar as they stand in the way of the fastest construction of the buildings. 2) Removal, expropriation and renting of machines of all kinds and their distribution to air force maintenance companies. 3) Forced transfer of laborers who are free or employed in companies - of whatever kind - and indeed both for the construction of the buildings and for use in air force armament companies. 4) Anticipation of raw materials that are absolutely necessary for the air force program...This applies in particular to light metal. 5) Removal and transfer of executives of the entire industry without regard to existing employment contracts under private law. As far as the defense industry is concerned, agreement must be reached with the army and navy where necessary. Cancellation or change of authorizations and granting of new authorizations, creation of joint ventures, patent pools, mergers of companies, formation of new companies and separation of uneconomically operating companies...6) Deviation from current provisions on war financing and performance compensation in cases where the highest possible increase in performance cannot be achieved otherwise...All decisions and measures taken by my authorized representative on the basis of the power of attorney shall be deemed to have been ordered by me. This power of attorney does not restrict the manufacture of tanks and submarines [last line is underlined by Goring]...'. File holes at the left margin, light toning, else very good. There was no marked increase in German production in the autumn of 1940 in preparation for this major campaign. On 15 October, General Tschersich, the Luftwaffe's chief of procurement, was basing aircraft replacement on the assumption peace with Britain would be secured, and there would be no further military operations until 1 April 1947. Either the procurement officers of the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe were unaware of Hitler's intentions, or they did not take him seriously. Erhard Milch, responsible for production, warned the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht that the Soviet Union could not be defeated in 1941. He called for winter preparations and increases in production in the expectation the war in the East, even if successful, would last several years. The battles in the Netherlands, Belgium, France and in the Balkans had inflicted losses the Luftwaffe had not fully replaced. By the conclusion of the Balkans campaign, the strain put on German resources and its effects on production was already showing, even before Barbarossa began. The Germans had only 1,511 bombers available for operations on 21 June 1941, compared with 1,711 on 11 May 1940, two hundred fewer. While overall, the Luftwaffe had remained much the same size, it was arguably weaker in crew quality than it had been in 1939, owing to the losses it had suffered, even in successful campaigns. The failures in production, and the fact that Barbarossa began with an inadequate number of aircraft, would lead to the Luftwaffe being severely depleted by the end of the year, and becoming increasingly ineffective, while consequently the Russian air force, thought destroyed in the early battles, became increasingly potent by end of 1941.